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“You Cannot Transform the History of Ideas 
Into a Comic Strip”:
An Interview with Marc Angenot
I spoke with Marc Angenot during a visit he made to the University of Western On-
tario, Canada, in .The interview lasted almost two hours, and has been edited for
clarity.
—Robert Barsky
Robert Barsky:Your work has not been engaged by the community of
literary and historical scholars in the United States. There have been
the usual intellectual fads, and concomitant intellectual roadblocks
along the way, but for some reason your work, your approach, hasn’t
quite entered the debate. Why is this?
Marc Angenot: There have been a number of ongoing fads for conti-
nental French-speaking thinkers, philosophers, and theoreticians, but
to a certain degree all these fads seem worn out, or are vanishing away.
I don’t mind much. It’s very hard to find out how and when and why
in a given intellectual milieu some kind of thinking or paradigm be-
comes fashionable or suddenly looks interesting to a group of people.
We must assume that the component of misunderstanding is usually
much more important than the actual relevance of what is being un-
derstood.When there are different sets of expectations, different issues,
and different stakes, there is clearly a better chance for one to be mis-
understood. So I really don’t mind much. I’m not too interested in
creative misunderstandings.
RB: Is one of the obstacles to understanding the overall corpus of your
work the fact that you are primarily a historian who teaches in a lit-
erature department? Or does the problem extend elsewhere, since
your work in history is deeply informed by discourse analysis and dis-
course theory? One way or the other, your work doesn’t fit easily into
any of the traditional disciplines as the university defines them.
MA: I am only one of many. Most of my work has dealt with French,
or at least continental, material, so it may not look as relevant as all-
encompassing global theories. But there is nothing unusual in this;
most of the time, people who become known are either senile or al-
ready dead. In the French-speaking realm, the most important
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thoughts of the twentieth century were actually digested, and became
widespread, twenty to forty years after the death of their author. The
process takes a long time, despite the myth one encounters in the me-
dia, that there exists an instantaneous diffusion of ideas. Normally it
would take forty to fifty years. Let’s work out a theory: If one’s think-
ing is easily understood it’s because it is just a variant of what every-
body expects; it is not very significant or original, but swallowable,
palatable. In that case, you stand a chance of being acclaimed without
much resistance. But if there is something that is unavoidably a bit dif-
ficult and only relevant for people who have already made an effort to
think in this framework, then it is perfectly reasonable to expect that
it will take at least one generation for it to be understood by the
people who need it, who are able to do something with it.
RB: Does what you’ve just said correspond to your approach to socio-
criticism, where you talk about literature “coming afterwards,” speak-
ing after other discourses have had their say? In the article that follows
this interview, you distinguish between literary texts that speak to
contemporary concerns in familiar ways and those which are more
challenging, less familiar. According to your conception, the latter type
has a greater chance of enduring. Is that a possible corollary?
MA: Yes. Either a given thought that looks revolutionary or original
is, in fact, made out of recycled or worn-out paradigms, so it works
easily in the short term and then just fades away, or what you are do-
ing relates to a specific community of scholars and is invested with a
certain effort. In the latter case, it will take fifteen to twenty years for
a small group of people to see what you are doing. I’m not even ex-
pecting that. There is an existential angle to the suggestion that there
is some kind of pleasure to be expected from being an acclaimed in-
tellectual. The way intellectuals work does not normally operate this
way. Individuals have their own fair share of vanity. But we all know
where life is leading us. That’s not the issue. I seldom meet anyone I
respect who, like a politician, works in order to gain popular acclaim.
It’s not that they would dislike it, but dealing with intellectual issues is
quite a different endeavor. It entails loneliness, certainly, and not pop-
ularity. That’s the way it is. Since we do this kind of work while be-
ing more or less protected from police inquiries, and getting a pay-
check every fortnight, we can say we are just operating according to
our role in society. That’s the way it should be.
RB: The other obstacle to understanding your work is the sheer am-
bition of the intellectual task you pursue.There are very few theorists
who have attempted to talk about all domains of discursive work, as
you have in your inquiries about “grand narratives,” or in your work
on the year , and there are very few historians who are willing to
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engage the theoretical or philosophical issues that are so central to
your perspective. That kind of ambition is challenging not only for
you, but for those people who wish to study in your framework.Your
social discourse theory, for example, places a huge burden of respon-
sibility upon us, demanding nothing less than our engaging the whole
social discourse paradigm prior to studying the discursive action that
happens within it.This work is monumental. I wonder how that plays
both in your work and in its reception.
MA: You start in life with a set of unanswered questions. And in a
naive way, you expect that at some given moment you will find the
right answers. But of course, it is an endless process.The generation of
people who started university in the sixties began with a great num-
ber of relatively new and unanswered questions about culture, ideolo-
gies, aesthetic value, the interface between societal values and aesthetic
ones, and so on. We experimented with different paradigms. I tried
not to disregard this set of issues in favor of comfortable answers.With
my social discourse theory I tried to explore the basic contentions
about ideology. For instance, how does a society try to produce val-
ues? And for what kind of so-called interests? It took me ten years to
write four or five books on the social discourse of  in France.
What I’m doing right now is another way of asking myself the same
set of questions in response to the same set of problems. It’s not in my
temperament to become a specialist in any given theoretical paradigm.
My work on social discourse led me to try to understand what
modernity was all about. What is central to modernity is a new way
of dealing with evil.That’s what I’m working with now, new ways of
dealing with evil as determined by so-called “wrong” social organiza-
tions.You find an axiomatics of social evil, replace it with its contrary,
and work out a brave new world based on different axiomatics. But it
is just a different axiomatic. I’m dealing with evil and its cures.We live
in a society where we know that evil still exists, but we are not sure
there is a cure for it. It’s either back to the premodern metaphysical
stance about human nature, or not. An epistemology from the starting
point is the unknowable, the idea that the world is just a scandal. Not
in the eyes of the rightful, like in the religions, where you can over-
come the scandals of the world. There is a hidden providence that
takes care of the basic scandal, which is the success of the wicked and
the misery of the righteous. I don’t believe we think in order to make
the world we are supposed to study clearer and more consistent; we
think in order to hide in the basic scandal of the empirical world and
our inability to tackle it. I am in the midst of changing my approach.
That’s true. Whatever I have done at any given stage of my intellec-
tual career has opened up onto a new set of issues that seem to de-
mand an overall reworking of my questioning.
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RB: Is there not some strong consistency, even despite this evolution?
The questions you posed early in your career, about the relationship be-
tween the center and the margins, the utterance and the entirety, seem
to lead to the questions you are posing now, and there is, in my opin-
ion, a red thread that runs from studies of paraliterature and science
fiction through social discourse theory and the grand narratives.
MA: That is not for me to answer. I don’t have the right angle to see
myself as both subject and object.You don’t have to start at the age of
twenty with a general program you end up implementing before re-
tirement. If consistency implies that you did not give up at a certain
moment, saying “this is too complicated,” or “I cannot solve this,” then
my work is consistent. The usual reproach made in intellectual
polemics about scholars such as Michel Foucault is that his work is in-
consistent because it is clear from one book to another that not only
his object of analysis, but his basic heuristic tools changed dramatically.
This is a very superficial kind of objection.That’s why my scandal hy-
pothesis seems to work, because it suggests that, even with changes in
approach, scholars are still hindered by the same blind spot. One’s
thinking tends to focus on a blind spot, not on some dawn of certi-
tude that emanates from the work out into the world.
RB: I have taught your approach to discourse and history on a num-
ber of occasions, and find that students are excited by your interest in
left wing movements, your assessment of what literature undertakes to
accomplish, and by the general discourse theory you propose. They
also tend to perceive a link between the different projects, suggesting
that they can learn something about how one should act in the world,
even though most of your analysis specifically renounces the idea of
applying a particular paradigm to solving the problems of the world.
MA: Younger intellectuals in the s started with certainties that
have vanished in the current generation. They have been replaced by
a general disorientation, an inability to conserve certainties as solid
bases for criticizing society. There is a certain degree of disenchant-
ment in the current context. But one can do something with disen-
chantment, which is to become truly critical, to renounce the idea
that virtuous faithfulness is the right starting point for examining an
occasionally unbearable world. It is true that most of the scholars who
were young in the sixties, and who are now my age, started with some
kind of personal tinkering that aimed at deconstructing the orthodox
Marxist or leftist set of certainties. When I was a student of romance
languages in the early sixties, we were all just starting to learn about
these people who have now become so familiar, beginning with Fer-
dinand de Saussure, and then, a few years later, Jakobson, Lévi-Strauss,
Bakhtin, Weber, Simmel, and then the whole classical tradition, sup-
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plemented by the range of new social science theorists.We could have
worked out some kind of eclectic, superficial paradigm with this
hodgepodge of methodologies; on the other hand, if you took seri-
ously what these people were dealing with, you had the whole twen-
tieth century jumping into your face. In light of this, the great temp-
tation of my generation was clearly towards eclecticism, the idea of
piling up without reworking. Today, because things have become less
clear and more complicated, we are probably better positioned to look
at the perverted effects of virtuous civic assumptions, in part because
we are not as naive as we used to be. It has always been easy for people
to believe that it is more virtuous to be in favor of the miserable than
the omnipotent, rich, wicked people of this world. You can feel that
your basic virtuous assumptions shield you from having to criticize
your own position. But issues have become extremely complicated at
the end of this century, and if they are going to be dealt with in a se-
rious, responsible, perspicacious, insightful way, they can no longer be
addressed through easy and simplistic values.
RB: But how are we to gain this level of awareness? People are born
without knowledge of their social discourse, they’re simply sur-
rounded by it and immersed in all of its categories, opinions, values,
and prejudices. In order to understand a prevailing social discourse,
they must come to recognize its existence and then grapple with its
peculiar characteristics. What does this entail?
MA: What one needs, what one has always needed, and what we ex-
pect from modern human beings, is suspicion.We are being immersed
in a given state of social discourse, with its axiologies, values, and para-
digms, and whatever else we can intuitively try to locate therein. It is
not enough to accept this position as natural and work within it, like
splashing around in a lukewarm bath. What you have to say is, like in
Porgy and Bess,“it ain’t necessarily so.” What does that mean? It’s easy
enough to say “it ain’t necessarily so” when you’re dealing with other
people, other proofs, and other places. But it’s certainly more de-
manding, and more urgent, to try to see your own society as ex-
tremely queer and bizarre.
RB: It’s interesting to hear you say that, because this is one of Noam
Chomsky’s credos. It’s not that there are strong overlaps between your
work and his, but one of the things he says in his discussion of the po-
litical world is that it’s a lot easier to talk about the “other” (especially
the official enemy) than it is to talk about one’s own society.The work
involved with getting to know oneself or, in this case, the context one
takes as the norm, is not only daunting, but intrinsically unsettling.
MA: In any kind of research, you don’t start with your conclusions in
hand, but with something that looks surprising. All the major thinkers
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of this century started with something that looked absolutely banal
and familiar to ordinary people but was extremely surprising to them,
to the point where they were ready to spend thirty or forty years of
their lives trying to make sense of it. For me, culture and cultural val-
ues are extremely strange, but saying that they are arbitrary doesn’t
amount to much, and neither does the bombastic attitude of saying
that we can easily disentangle ourselves from cultural arbitrariness. All
these catch words about cultural relativity do not answer the question.
Perhaps that’s a good example of something that prevents us from do-
ing critical work. You cannot look at the world and say, “Okay, we
know what cultural relativity is, we know that its values are arbitrary
and that they change historically, thereby concealing the interests of
the dominant groups in society.”That is bullshit. It’s not an answer, it’s
just provisional labeling in order to start asking other questions, which
will be potentially much more insightful, much more demanding.
RB: In a sense, you are proposing a theory of suspicion, an approach
to seeing the world through new eyes. But how do you teach a theory
of strangeness? How do you teach people to look at the world and
think of it as strange?
MA: According to my own assumptions, I am a product of a number
of objective possibilities that exist at this moment in our civilization.
In the last thirty years, we have been provided with an extensive num-
ber of heuristic tools from the likes of Bakhtin, Lévi-Strauss, Jakobson,
Propp, the narratologists, the linguists, the sociologists, and so on.They
provided us with a gigantic workload, but they also provided us with
tools that, although valuable, were not suited for all circumstances or
all issues. Today, a young intellectual working in socio-historical cul-
tural studies has at his or her disposal many more tools than we had
even one or two generations ago. What we have to do at any given
moment is use the tools that have been made available, but not just for
their respective formal purposes. For instance, what we need now is a
new, strong, and dynamic problematology, a new set of heuristic ques-
tionings. We are faced as well with something that is much more im-
portant: the twentieth century itself. It unfolded with its tragedies, dra-
mas, and catastrophes and it has been a scandal from the s on. I
suppose there is, at the end of this century, an ethical predicament that
comes from having the tools for asking the right questions. We are
asking a great number of questions, and some might not be the right
ones. Over the last thirty years there has been a great temptation, es-
pecially in literary studies, to veil one’s face, not to look at the com-
plexities of the ethical world, but instead to make sense of narratolog-
ical gimmicks and post-modernistic texts. I don’t want to let these
tools go rotten in my workshop; I want to do something with them.
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RB: Does literature play a special role in all of this? What is literary
knowledge? Does it teach us the problematological approach because
it is by nature something that poses unusual or strange questions?
MA: Literature does occasionally play a special role, but I’m interested
in something else that I’m not sure I want to name or label, something
that is neither literature nor actual cultural civilization. I’m studying
the strangeness of symbolic inventiveness during the last two cen-
turies, trying to understand things whose location is not necessarily
found in what we call literature. It may be music, it may be comic
strips, it may be political propaganda. I know what I’m looking at, but
I’m not sure it’s something that can be found in one specific cultural
field. It is not inventiveness in the sense of creativity, which looks like
some kind of psychological phenomenon. Literature as such, as an es-
tablished institution, does not necessarily provide what I’m looking
for. At given moments, the most promising and creative ideas came
from places other than literature. In the Romantic period in France,
you would not find inventiveness by reading Lamartine. You have to
go to other cellars and attics, you have to explore the modern city
rather than the literary salon. You go to a city where you are a for-
eigner and you ask yourself, where should I go? Under what roof is
there something that will be truly astonishing?
RB: The roof you describe is not only a physical place, like a bar or a
café, but also the gathering place for popular movements. I’m think-
ing of your work on anarchists, socialists, and Marxists, and your stud-
ies of paraliterature, political pamphlets, and marginal discourses in a
range of domains.
MA: In popular movements, as we have seen over the last centuries,
the boldest emancipatory dreams of modern times and the most dan-
gerous, fanatical tendencies can coexist. You can find in the conflicts
of utopian thought and established blindness things that are worth
looking at. One of the very dangerous attitudes of our time is the
Philistine one that says so many mistakes have been made in these two
centuries, and we have fallen into such abominable traps, that it’s just
the right moment to forget about it all and start doing something dif-
ferent. On the contrary, I feel that that’s where all the things worth
learning will be found.
RB: I have heard the opposite from Michel Serres, who says that now
is the moment to abandon memory.
MA:There are a number of easy programs that encourage us to disre-
gard, to look elsewhere. Michel Serres is just one example of this type
of attitude, such as a faith in science that prevents you from looking at
the horrors of positivism or the fact that science has played an ex-
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tremely threatening and inhuman role in history. If you’re not Michel
Serres, you can play the role of official pervert, like Baudrillard has
done, by going adrift toward catastrophes and pleasures and describ-
ing them to accomplices in perversity. Or you can take another tack,
like going back to the church or synagogue. In times of crisis there are
a number of charlatans around, the televangelists of intellectual circles,
who tell you there is a way to salvation, especially if you’re willing fol-
low them and not look back. It’s not that I enjoy looking backwards,
but I don’t think modern societies or humankind in general are in a
position to reinvent the world. I don’t want to tell people what to do;
they have to guide themselves. Modern societies have a big problem
dealing with their own memory. I am a memorialist, not a historian.
Historiography tends to be transformed into a narrative oriented to-
ward a meaningful future. I’m not an entomologist dealing with
smaller insects, but a memorialist dealing with different moments in
history, where given groups of people or sects have been in the same
position we are now, trying to make sense of a world that seems hos-
tile and threatening.That is my only solution. Occasionally great writ-
ers, such as Joyce or Kafka, offer a way to deal with modern times that
is too easy.They were minor geniuses. I want to find out how, at very
different moments, in different circles, and in different settings, people
try to account for the societal scandal.That is it.These may be groups
of anarchists, union parties, feminists, pacifists, and so on.
RB: How does this relate to your current work on militancy?
MA: I’m interested in the array of militant groups that emerged out
of the contradictions of modern societies. That’s one angle of ap-
proach, one way of dealing with modernity. I think there is much to
be done in terms of understanding the invention of propaganda, be-
cause it relates to people’s efforts to come up with answers to social
ills. I’ve been researching the forgotten utopian socialists of the s,
who thought they could say, a century and a half ago,“I’ve got the fi-
nal ultimate answer.” During this period the term “utopianists,” in-
vented not by Marx but by conventional journalists, suggested you
could simply forget them, leave them in the attic. I want to make sense
of the kind of strange discursive output they produced. This is part
and parcel of the wider project of describing marginal figures of mod-
ern times; the “utopianists” are one of many figures of modernity, al-
beit very observant ones. Although we would all agree that their an-
swers were wrong, we should tackle the questions that triggered them
to elaborate the all-encompassing answers they attempted to provide.
Saying that they are obsolete does not mean that whenever we read a
Victorian newspaper we do not encounter, in the same naive way, the
same kinds of questioning, the same kind of social critiques that, in
another time, allowed them to work out an overall system. There is
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something there that can make a researcher or scholar or intellectual
happy. Such an open-ended program will easily fill several lives.
You began this discussion asking “How do you feel about your
work being known or not known, or being influential on other
people, either during or after your lifetime?” My sense of eternity is
that I deal with issues that are subjectively relevant, and I approach
them within a program that I will not be able to fulfill as a human be-
ing within the existential constraint between cradle and sepulcher.
That is perhaps the best answer to the question of how to find a sense
of eternity: doing something you will not be able to fulfill.
RB: The discussion of memory, and the previous discussion of
methodology, leads to another difficult problem: not only studying
, but evaluating the relationship between the studies of  and
, , , and so on. I don’t know if this is an obstacle or a
challenge, but if we are to understand the world as you are describing
it, we must be able to concentrate on a certain time, in all of its com-
plexity, while situating it as a time among other times.
MA: What surprises me about the idea of working within a so-called
synchronic slice, aside from the methodological issues it entails, is the
contemporaneity of the people who live within the so-called same so-
ciety. In studying a late nineteenth-century society, like France in ,
you discover a set of common values, topoi, dominant ideas, and par-
adigms, while at the same time, you find people within this so-called
hegemony operating in totally divergent directions to such an extent
that they may not seem contemporaneous to each other. We live in a
society where we are assumed to have a sense of community, to be-
long, but if you knew the ideas in everybody’s mind in this so-called
community, you would be extremely surprised. That’s why I wrote
papers and books on anti-Semitism as it developed in late nineteenth-
century France. These issues seem worth studying, not in order to
warn people against the dangers of fanaticism, but because it is so
strange that these ideas existed, and were so successfully imagined.
RB:What does your work reveal about science as a narrative and sci-
ence as a practice?
MA: I’ve done some work on what could be described as established
sciences, work on the psychopathology of hysteria in the nineteenth
century. Life is too short. I would certainly like to do other things. I
have perhaps managed to satiate my curiosity here and there, but I’ve
worked in these sectors without being very satisfied with the kind of
findings I come up with.
RB: In The Postmodern Condition, Lyotard suggests that science is a nar-
rative with its own rules and criteria for adjudication that are estab-
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lished according to the contemporary scientific paradigm, and that
therefore one can think about scientific discourse in terms of other
narrative practices. Another model might suggest the opposite, that
pure science is the study of the next thing, that the scientist builds in-
crementally upon the solid basis of knowledge previously uncovered
on the road to truly understanding the object of his or her research.
The distance between those two is vast, and it underwrites the prob-
lem of how we talk about science. What does your work have to say
about these approaches?
MA: Most research in what can be termed historical epistemology
deals with things that are already end-products.The master narratives
of scientific disciplines, for instance, are in a way end-products; they
do not provide a key for the reasons why these narrative frameworks
have been implemented and organized the way they have been.That’s
what I’m trying to do in my work on the so-called utopian socialists.All
the work that has been done on Charles Fourier, or others, deals with
the counter-proposals, the utopian programs they offered up to solve the
problems of society.But my questions begin long before these programs,
suggesting that the end-products are not extremely significant in them-
selves. I would like to find out about the genealogical process, the ac-
tual logic of questioning, the social critique, as it were, rather than what
triggered their questioning. The fact that scientific paradigms crumble
and become superseded may be the right way of describing things at a
given level, but in a way you are just describing end-products and not
the very process of scientific invention.That’s why my first work in sci-
ences was on human paleontology. It was so typically a master narra-
tive, in which an image of progress unfolded through the processes of
early humankind. Now I would probably deal with these issues in a
different way. I would start with the big metaphor of digging; you dig
in the soil of the cave and find things you identify as artifacts. Out of
these pebbles, something like a narrative seems to emanate. I don’t like,
for heuristic reasons, the Lyotardian paradigm; it operates at a superfi-
cial level where symptoms can be examined and recognized, but you
never try to find out what these symptoms really are. In Marxism or so-
cialism, the question is not what kind of remedial program they com-
mand,but how they look at exploitation in order to identify themselves.
Why was it obvious? Why was it understood in terms of exploitation,or
slavery? I’m now studying the abolitionists of slavery in the s and
s, which allows for the same kind of questioning.
RB: Why aren’t these questions asked in other research paradigms? Is
there something in the way we approach intellectual work that leads
us away from posing certain types of questions?
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MA: Nobody ever asked the most obvious questions because they
were too obvious.Why was the abolition of slavery considered a good
thing, and by whom? What are they doing right now? How do they
construe the situation? We shouldn’t ask how well they solved the
problem, but rather what basic assumptions of humankind they pre-
supposed when thinking about abolition.This allows a different angle
of approach, something that is, aside from all other considerations,
promising. Whenever we deal with the history of Marxism or Marx-
ist thought we take for granted basic Marxist assumptions—not that
they are far-fetched or absurd or chimerical. We accept these mental
processes when they are already in action. It is already recognized that
poverty, or the proletarian condition, was not only miserable, but that
it should be transformed into something else. That’s why I deal with
the productivist paradigm. Productivist means that in order to trans-
form society, you have to increase the production of material goods.
A number of anarchists who want to go back to the caves question the
very idea of whether an increase in the production of material goods
was the preliminary condition that transformed society and made it
more harmonious and just. I return to the basic golden rule:“It ain’t
necessarily so.” What is exploitation? Why is war abominable, and
peace desirable? And so on.Throughout the nineteenth century, there
were always a few unpleasant people who said that war was the best
thing for humankind. Peace was a form of daydreaming for philan-
thropists. Without war you would not be able to change the hierar-
chies in society, because there is no such thing as a truly egalitarian so-
ciety. I’m not looking at individuals, I’m looking at Gordian knots of
questions—lots of questions.They have never been disassembled, and
they are still around. That’s why we are, in fact, still in modernity.
Along the way we lost a number of certainties about progress, human
nature, and the remedies for social evils.There are a number of things
that don’t work any longer. I’m not interested in projecting my own
narratives onto the set of modern narratives by telling you that at the
end of the play these were the good cops and these were the bad ones.
I’m looking at the Gordian knots of extremely complicated issues.
RB: Is it possible that these questions were posed, or even considered,
but that we don’t recognize them on account of our current views on
the matter?
MA: Indeed. Fourier wrote a number of papers nobody wants to
quote today, saying that if we emancipate the African slaves in North
America in the way the philanthropists want to, we will make their
condition more miserable, due to this and that argument. You cannot
transform the history of ideas into a comic strip. People were much
more insightful than we’d like to think they were. They saw at the
outset that situations could not be superseded by virtue of one truly
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obvious solution or another. We would like to think that our fore-
fathers were naive daydreamers, and that now we are clever and lucid.
But these people have seen in their own way the contradictions of
given approaches, even when they seemed to be the most rational and
generous solutions for humankind.There has been a big bang of em-
pirical and symbolic change over the last few centuries, and it is still
expanding. We are just trying to make sense of this. Perhaps we too
should work like the astronomers, that is, we should explore a nova or
a galaxy without having the ultimate answer, the true dynamic of this
thing we call the universe. That comes from my training in rhetoric;
I’m much more interested in discovering the anonymous logic that
presides over the major rumbling debates of modern times than just
figuring out if some guy or another was right about a particular issue.
I don’t want to come off as a deus ex machina sitting on a cloud, arbi-
trating at the end of modern times and saying:“These were the right
guys.” If modern humankind had found solutions, we would know
about them. Since we do not see many solutions that are irreversible
and totally harmonious, we can probably say— but not in a wishy-
washy post-modern way— that modern societies are operatic, as they
say in philosophy.Whatever solution we try to work out imposes an-
other dead end, instead of providing a positive dialectics superseding
the contradictions. We try to get out of it, again and again, but the
process recurs, maybe infinitely.This is not a very optimistic paradigm,
but if someone had managed to find a solution, we’d have known
about it. Let’s be naive for a while. After the French Revolution, all
over the developing worlds of Europe and North America, people
started criticizing society, the human condition, and thousands of
people came up with programs, solutions, ideas, remedies, and so on.
At this stage we can say either/or: Either they actually found a solu-
tion and we overlooked it, or, more probable, there was no solution. I
tend to think there is no solution, but I don’t conclude in a Philistine
way that therefore one must give oneself over to drink. I want to find
out how these Gordian knots of questions were cut, because history
doesn’t tell us how effective a solution was.
I suppose this is why we can rehabilitate literature, to return to one
of your earlier questions: Literature never came up with a final solu-
tion.That is what Flaubert and Kafka have in common, and that is my
final point in “What Can Literature Do?” Everyone external to the
literary field thought that they had the right solution, and the most
logical thing was to ask literary figures to put themselves in the serv-
ice of these certainties. We do not generally believe that a theocratic
literature or a Stalinist literature was the best thing, but we must be
able to say why it was not. We should not do the Pharisee dance that
claims human beings do not need ultimate answers to their queries.
In the middle of a strike of the CGT (Confédération général de tra-
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vail) in France, a reading of Marcel Proust does not provide any strong
reinforcement of your will to fight your oppressor. Literature as a dis-
course does not provide answers to legitimate questions, which is not
to say these questions are irrelevant. In Madame Bovary, the pharmacist
has all the answers because he is Voltairian and not Rousseauist. The
Abbé is also an answer-giver, because he was taught the Catholic
apologetics in the seminary. Madame Bovary, on the other hand, does
not have the answer to the question of whether or not she should re-
main faithful to her husband. At the very least, what Flaubert’s text
does is not provide us with any answers to any questions that are not
discarded as illegitimate. There is probably a role, a very specific role,
for literature, in what I call the Gordian model of modern thinking.
It doesn’t tell us we can disentangle this knot of contradictions, or that
we can cut it in the middle like most militant people would do.What
it says is: look at the questions, because if you’re patient, you may learn
something.
RB: The role Michel Meyer ascribes to literature in books like Prob-
lematology, Meaning and Reading, and even Philosophy and the Passions, is
somewhat similar.1 For him, literature is not there to help us deter-
mine logic, or to find answers. He uses it instead as a starting point for
a problematology, a questioning.
MA: I like Meyer’s Meaning and Reading. I agree with his conclusions.
Literature does not provide meaning, in the sense that it does not il-
luminate a contradictory world and then transform these contradic-
tions into certainties. That is why Meyer, in his own way and within
his own logic, as a philosopher, comes up with the same answer I do
about the work that literature does and doesn’t do. If you have a friend
whose child has just died, you cannot tell her to go read Joyce and
find some answer to the scandal of death. Literature is a device that
helps us decipher not only the world, but the text that is part and par-
cel of the world in a more honest way than the monosemic, non-
contradictory paradigms available to us. Literature cannot transform
the world, as so many nice people in the twentieth century, including
Gide and Malraux, have suggested. Literature cannot emancipate hu-
man life. These people are not naïve, and are quite aware of the logic
of aesthetic writing, which suggests that the temptation of finding a
solution was, for them, extreme. Literature does not provide an answer
to the paradox. So why is it useful? Because it does not.There are some
thinkers, like Meyer, with different training and interests, who never-
theless come up with similar suggestions. I don’t think after all is said
and done that studying literature as such, for itself alone, can be the
object of any decent and encompassing discipline, even if undertaken
in my own way, by rehabilitating the extremely perverse logic of lit-
erature’s innocuousness.To the extent that literature is innocuous and
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impotent toward the evils of the world, we need it in order not to fool
ourselves. That’s fine. But if I like literature, I’m not sure I like litera-
ture departments, or literary teaching as such. I don’t like the fetishiza-
tion of symbolic inventiveness that is entailed in the study of a canon
of great texts, or not so great texts, or even a canon of texts produced
by the oppressed, the workers, the women. In each of these examples,
the attitude is to isolate a segment of this intertextual array of social
discourse and fetishize it. Of course some literary studies, like the
work undertaken by Bakhtin, not only provide us with sound schol-
arship but also show us that literature is something that operates on
the non-literary mesh of production. I’m interested in these pregnan-
cies, these Gordian knots, these endless conflicts.
RB: Literature does play an interesting role in your thinking, though.
You make reference to literary texts quite frequently.
MA: Occasionally I can hear the voices of writers, the strong and sig-
nificant voices of Proust or Kafka in the middle of these dissentions.
But I don’t think that literary departments as such are a good thing.
They correspond to an obsolete concept of division of labor in aca-
demia. Being interested in literature is no justification for having lit-
erature departments, in the same way it would be ridiculous to say an
interest in sex makes one a sexologist. Disciplines do not deal with
objects, they deal with questions. My set of questions makes me en-
counter, at given moments, and even frequently, literary texts, but
never exclusively, and never centrally. For some subsets of questions I
may have in mind, that are part of the problems I try to explain, liter-
ature is decidedly irrelevant. Not that I would criticize other col-
leagues who have different sets of questions and therefore suggest that
there are no good reasons to focus on the literary output of a given
place at a given moment. If you are dealing with social evil in the
s in Great Britain, you will read Oliver Twist in the same way that
you would read the philanthropists, the reformists, the chartists, and so
on. But in this case you do not isolate Dickens as something that
would be necessarily better, higher, or even of a different nature than
the pamphlets and writings of these philanthropists and reformers. In
dealing with the Gordian knot of questions, you try to discover where
a novelist like Dickens put his own thread.
RB:There is, in your work on master narratives, an interest in the sto-
ries society tells about itself and its various blind spots, but under-
writing all of this is something about the nature of human beings.We
have an intense need to tell ourselves stories, to invent narratives, to
fit them into the cycles of human life. Perhaps there is not only a de-
sire to process experience, but an actual physical requirement to inte-
grate narratives into our lives.
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MA: Our dreams, according to Freud, and everybody since antiquity,
are narratives. Freud found two contradictory dynamics in a dream:
the superficial logic of narrative consistency and the symptomatic dis-
crepancies that are supposed to emanate from repressed unconscious
elements in the dream. Human beings operate with two basic kinds of
symbolic imagery, arguments and narremes. Arguments suggest that
we are in a dialogical situation, working out an argument within a set
of implicit or explicit questions and counter-arguments. We cannot
build argumentation alone. Narremes are of another logic, a more
subjective one.These are the two sides.We cannot deal with narratol-
ogy alone; we must also deal with rhetoric and argumentation. Most
narratives are in fact argumentative devices. They are parables, se-
quences of events. They are also answers to a question. They offer a
solution to a practical or ontological problem.That’s why we can’t iso-
late narratology from rhetorical analyses. The basic issue in narratol-
ogy is the fantasy of consistency that makes a narrative seem to work
in ways similar to a dream.When a dream looks consistent, it’s only in
terms of its superficial features, whereas when the characters of the
dream suddenly seem blurred, when you can’t tell whether the char-
acter is an old woman or your mother, that is, when you cannot rec-
ognize the agents or the syntactic structure of the dream it becomes
interesting. I would try to generalize this kind of hermeneutic ap-
proach by saying that the point at which the narrative starts to become
dysfunctional is the point at which it is most worthy of our concern.
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